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bstract
This paper purposes a symmetric all-pay auction where the bidders compete neither for an object nor the object itself but for
 lottery on receive. That lottery is determined endogenously through the bids. This auction is known as chance auction or more
opularly as Chinese auction. The model considers the possibility that for some bidders the optimal strategy is to bid zero and to
ely on luck. It showed that bidders become less aggressive when the lottery satisfies a variational condition. It was also shown that
uck factor is decisive to determine if the expected payoff in Chinese auction is bigger or smaller than expected payoff in standard
ll-pay auction.
 2015 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
eserved.
EL classiﬁcation: D01; D44; D82
EL classiﬁcac¸ão: D01; D44; D82
eywords: Chinese auction; All-pay auction; Lottery; Bayesian equilibrium
esumo
Este trabalho propõe um modelo de leilão chinês, ou seja, um leilão all-pay sobre uma loteria. A loteria é determinada endoge-
amente através dos lances. O modelo considera a possibilidade de que, para alguns participantes a estratégia ótima é oferecer um
ance nulo e esperar pela sorte. É mostrado que a introduc¸ão de aleatoriedade no resultado do leilão pode tornar os participantes
enos agressivos caso a loteria satisfac¸a uma dada desigualdade variacional. Também é mostrado que o fator sorte é decisivo em
eterminar se os ganhos esperados são maiores ou menores no leilão chinês relativamente ao leilão all-pay padrão.
 2015 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
eserved.
alavras-chave: leilão chinês; leilão all-pay; loteria; equilíbrio Bayesiano
.  Introduction
The design of market institutions has been considered as one of the most important research objects since the
eginning of Economics. But it was when Game Theory emerged as an important analytical framework that the themeE-mail address: mauricio benegas@caen.ufc.br
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gained notoriety, since for the first time a series of important tools made possible a better understanding about this
subject.
Mechanism design and implementation theory made possible an approach such that virtually all allocation forms
could be understood through formal mathematical models. Auction theory, for example, is undisputedly considered as
a successful case in designing new market institutions.1 The applications of auction theory surpassed its basic purposes,
which are the understanding of allocation rules and price formation, as examples like first- and second-price all-pay
auctions,2 double auctions and score auctions indicate.
Two key results from auction theory, the Revenue Equivalence Theorem and the Linkage Principle, connect several
different types of auction mechanisms3 through their expected revenues. Amongst the conditions that support the
validity of these results, one is particularly important to this study: the auction mechanisms are standard in the sense
that the winner is the person bidding the highest amount.
There are, however, countless interesting situations where agents allocate their resources and the results are not
deterministically reached, i.e., a participant offers the highest bid and yet he is not the winner of the auction. This is the
case, e.g., of elections and patent races. In the first example, the candidate that spends more money is not necessarily
the one that is elected. In the case of patent races the prototype with the highest investment is not necessarily chosen.
These situations are usually treated as a contest where the probability of winning is proportional to the participant’s
bid.4
There are other situations subtly related to auction theory. For example, in Brazil, public sector jobs are fulfilled
through public contests. More specifically, a public institution announces the availability of one or more jobs which
require a well-defined and non-discriminatory selective process. In general, the referred selective process includes
general and specific exams according to job available. This type of mechanism has been adopted in Brazil since the
1950s and it is estimated that nowadays more than five million candidates apply for these contests every year. Generally,
the classification of the candidates depends on their performances in the exams; being hired are the ones with the highest
scores. Hence, an important question emerges: does higher effort lead to certain success in such mechanisms?
Suppose that all resources allocated by a candidate in a public contest (time, discipline, educational background,
etc.) can be evaluated in monetary terms. This value may be interpreted as a bid that is paid at any contingency.5 The
bids do not guarantee success but only a probability of success. Therefore, a public contest may be specifically viewed
as a first-price all-pay auction whose object being auctioned is not a good but a lottery where the bidder may either win
or lose the good. It is reasonable to assume that this lottery establishes a given probability of winning that depends on
the participant’s bid (effort). More specifically, one may assume that the probability of winning follows a stochastic
order where higher bids are associated with higher probabilities of winning.
This type of auction is also used in charitable events in order to raise funds and is popularly known as the Chinese
auction or, more formally, a chance auction.6
The main objective of this paper is to build a model to represent the Chinese auction, where its characteristics
are represented and its equilibrium is derived. First a general version is proposed where the probability of winning
is a continuous and increasing function of the bid. Afterwards, in order to derive some additional properties of the
equilibrium bid, it is supposed that this probability is a linear function of the bid. In both versions an exogenous and
common-knowledge probability of winning is assumed that will be referred to as the “luck factor”. This probability is
positive even when the bid is zero.In addition to the luck factor a realization defined as the threshold of the effective competitors is assumed. This
realization is also common knowledge. The idea is to allow the possibility of a partial pooling equilibrium where the
bidders with smaller values (below the threshold) rely on luck, choosing as an optimal strategy a zero bid.
1 Maskin (2004).
2 Second-price all-pay auctions are also known as “War of Attrition”. In Krishna and Morgan (1997), these two types of auctions are analyzed in
detail.
3 In fact, these results are independent of the type of the auction. For further details, see Krishna (2005) or Menezes and Monteiro (2008).
4 The literature about contests is vast and has its origins linked with the seminal works of Gordon Tullock about rent seeking. See Tullock (1967,
1980) and Konrad (2009).
5 Another way to describe the problem is to enquire about the monetary value that the candidate would be willing to pay in order to avoid the
effort, i.e., the amount that he or she will be indifferent either to pay or to effort.
6 The origin of the term is unclear.
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Among the results obtained it is shown that if the probability of winning satisfies a variational condition then the
quilibrium bids in a deterministic all-pay auction dominate the equilibrium bids in the Chinese auction. It is also
hown that the welfare comparison between these two types of auction depends on the magnitude of the luck factor.
inally, in the version where there is a linear probability of winning, simple comparative static exercises show that the
igher the threshold of the effective competitors the lower equilibrium bids are and, among effective competitors, the
esponse of the equilibrium bid to changes in the luck factor is asymmetric according to the proximity to the threshold.
Besides this introduction this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 a brief literature review is performed;
n Section 3 the model is formally presented; in Section 4 equilibrium is derived and its properties are analyzed; in
ection 5 the model with linear probability is proposed and, finally, in Section 6 the main conclusions are presented
nd some extensions are suggested.
.  Related  literature
In the majority of the references cited below, models are built based on the literature about contests to address
ituations where agents allocate their own (monetary or non-monetary) resources on the dispute for a prize where the
robability of winning depends on the amount of resources allocated.
Franke et al. (2009) proposed the design of a contest and its success function through multilevel programming.
he idea is to find the contest’s unique Nash equilibrium and then, based on a preference parameter, obtain a success
unction where aggregate effort is maximized. In this study the success function depends solely on the participant’s
id and is optimally determined in each agent’s utility maximization problem.
Kaplan et al. (2002) proposed an all-pay auction where the prize (or ex-post utility) does not depend only on the
gent’s valuation but also on its bid. Although their objectives were different the model proposed in this study is
somorphic to the multiplicatively separable environment proposed by Kaplan et al. (2002).
Based on Taylor (1995), Fullerton et al. (2002) proposed a innovation competition model in two stages: first, a
ontest search type is conducted by a sponsor that afterwards determines the prize through a first-price auction. Hence,
n Fullerton et al. (2002), the competition model occurs separately. It is worth mentioning that in the contest stage the
uccess function is endogenously determined.
Matros (2006) extends Tullock’s basic model allowing the contest’s prize valuation to be asymmetric among the
articipants. The author concludes that the increase in equilibrium total revenues7 with the addition of new participants
ersists in the asymmetric case. It is worth mentioning that this result is maintained even when the addition of new
articipants may eventually reduce the number of effective competitors. In summary, as the author states,
“This result shows that the quality of the active players (i.e., their valuations of the prize) is more important than
their quantity.”
Maldovanu and Sela (2006) designed a competition model with elimination stages. The effort’s cost function includes
n ability parameter that is private information for each competitor. The authors show that when the cost is a concave
or linear) function of effort, the equilibrium total expected effort in a single contest with a unique prize is greater than
n a competition scheme with elimination stages where in each stage a certain number of prizes are allocated.
.  The  model
The model encompasses an all-pay8 auction of an indivisible object, with N  ≥  2 risk-neutral participants who have
he following characteristics:. the agent i submits a bid bi and has valuation vi that is his private information;
. the reward in case of winning the auction is not a good but a probability distribution over events {receive, do not
receive}.
7 In Contest Theory the total revenue is referred as rent dissipation.
8 For simplicity, is supposed that the auction is mandatory.
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Define the random variable X  as follows:
X  =
{
1 if the object is received
0 otherwise
so that p = Pr [X  = 1]. Assume that individual i has a Bernoulli utility defined as:
ui(x) =  vix
where vi ∈  [0,  ω] with ω > 0. His expected utility in a lottery p  will be:
Ui(p) =  pvi
For any bidder i, the winning probability function9 is defined as p(bi) =  Pr[X  =  1| bi], where bi is a bid of agent
i. It is implicit that the winning probability is anonymous, depending solely on the participant’s bid. The assumption
of anonymity may not be supported empirically. Castelar et al. (2009), for example, analyzed a specific public contest
and concluded that there are socio-economic characteristics of individuals that interfere dramatically on the winning
probability. In other words, with the same effort (bid) individuals may have different winning probabilities. On the other
hand, if this supposition is withdrawn a symmetric equilibrium would not be possible, not to mention that anonymity
is among the desired axioms of success functions in contests.10
Some assumptions are made below:
Assumption 1.  p(·) is continuous and twice differentiable function so that p(0) = ε > 0 and p′ > 0.
Assumption 2.  The values of the bidders in Chinese auction correspond to a vector of iid random variables according
to a distribution F  with support [0, ω]. F  is absolutely continuous and on its differentiable points F′ = f, and f is a
positive and limited function within [0, ω].
Assumption  3.  There is a realization v˜ ∈ [0,  ω] so that [p(bi) −  ε]vi >  bi for any i such that vi > v˜ and bi ≥  0, and
[p(bi) −  ε]vi ≤  bi for any i such that vi ≤ v˜.
Assumption  4.  All aspects considered in Assumptions 1–3 are common knowledge.
In Assumption 1 ε is an exogenous probability of winning that will be called from now on as “luck factor”.
The assumption that p(·) is strictly increasing guarantees a first-order stochastic dominance for the lotteries that are
associated with higher bids. Furthermore, Supposition 3 (allow the possibility that exist) guarantees the existence of
a pool of sufficiently low types that rely on luck. Based on this possibility, Definition 1, makes a distinction between
bidders in the Chinese auction.
Deﬁnition  5.  A bidder i will be considered an effective competitor in Chinese auction if and only if vi > v˜. Otherwise
i will be deemed a non-effective competitor. The realization v˜ is referred as a threshold of effective competitors.
For any participant i a strategy is a function βi : [0,  ω] →  [0,  b] such that βi(0) = 0 and βi(ωi) =  b  >  0. It is assumed
that βi is a continuous and increasing function.11 In a symmetric equilibrium it is admitted that βi = β  for any i. It is
worth mentioning that, implicitly, even with symmetric bidders there is a possibility of pooling for those below v˜.
The nature of competition requires that each effective competitor submits his bid in such a way that his expected
utility is maximized, considering that he or she expects to have the maximum winning probability in the lottery that
is assigned according to his bid. An effective competitor is only concerned with competition against other effective
rivals, since the others (if any) receive a lottery with an exogenous winning probability ε that is common knowledge.9 That function is analogous to success function in Contest Theory. The main difference is that in the second case the probabilities depends on all
bids.
10 Skarpedas (1996) offers a detailed discussion about the axioms on success function. In Hwang (2009), the author proposes an unified form of
success functions and test the empirical support to several particular forms.
11 Therefore differentiable almost everywhere.
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herefore, obtaining the maximum winning probability should be conditioned to competition solely against other
ffective competitors.
It is assumed that each effective competitor is uncertain about the number of existing effective rivals and, therefore, his
xpected gain should include this uncertainty.12 Hence, being an effective rival or not is modeled as a binomial random
ariable whose probability of success (being an effective rival) is common knowledge since Pr[v  > v˜] =  1 −  F (v˜).
From the perspective of a give bidder, if the number of effective rivals is a random variable ˜K, then the probability
hat there are exactly K  effective rivals is given by
Pr[ ˜K  =  K] =
(
N  −  1
K
)
[1 −  F (v˜)]KF (v˜)(N−1)−K
The possible values of ˜K lie between 0 (there are no effective rivals) and N −  1 (all other participants are effective
ivals).
.  Equilibrium
Let a participant i with vi > v˜ and define the set NiK =  {j  ∈ N; vj > v˜, j /=  i}  such that #NiK =  K. Hence, if i
elieves that there are exactly K  effective rivals, his ex-ante expected utility could be written as follows:
πi(vi,  bi, K) =  p(bi)viEv−i
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣1{
p(bi)≥max
j∈Ni
K
p(β(vj))
}
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
vj > v˜, ∀j  ∈  NiK
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦−  bi (1)
Since p(·) and β(·) are increasing functions, (1) can be rewritten as
πi(vi,  bi, K) =  p(bi)viPr
[
YKmax ≤  β−1(bi)
∣∣∣YKmin > v˜]−  bi
here YKmax e YKmin are, respectively, the highest and the lowest order statistics amongst K  independent random variables.
iven i’s uncertainty towards the number of effective rivals, he chooses his bid so that
N−1∑
K=0
(
N  −  1
K
)
πi(vi, bi,  K)[1 −  F (v˜)]KF (v˜)(N−1)−K (2)
ould be maximized.
roposition  6.  Let  G  = FN−1,  then  (2) is  equal  to:
p(bi)viG(β−1(bi)) −  bi
roof.  Arnold et al. (2008) show that
Pr
[
YKmax ≤  β−1(bi)
∣∣∣YKmin > v˜] =
[
F (β−1(bi)) −  F (v˜)
]K
˜
K[1 −  F (v)]
12 Note that the uncertainty is not about the number of participants; it is related to who are the effective competitors. A general model for the first
ase is presented by McAfee and McMillan (1987).
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Therefore, the agent’s expected payoff is
p(bi)vi
N−1∑
K=0
⎛
⎝N  −  1
K
⎞
⎠ [F (β−1(bi)) −  F (v˜)]K
[1 −  F (v˜)]K [1 −  F (v˜)]
KF (v˜)(N−1)−K −  bi
=  p(bi)vi
N−1∑
K=0
⎛
⎝N  −  1
K
⎞
⎠[F (β−1(bi)) −  F (v˜)]KF (v˜)(N−1)−K −  bi
=  p(bi)viG(β−1(bi)) −  bi

Using Proposition 6, the participant i’s problem becomes13
max
bi
p(bi)viG(β−1(bi)) −  bi (3)
The first-order conditions of this problem is given by
p′(bi)viG(β−1(bi)) +  p(bi)vig(β−1(bi))dβ
−1(bi)
dbi
=  1 (4)
If in equilibrium bi =  β(vi) then in (4) one should have that
p′(β(vi))β′(vi)G(vi)vi +  p(β(vi))g(vi)vi =  β′(vi) (5)
Hence, participant i’s equilibrium bid with value vi > v˜ is obtained by the solution of the following differential
equation:
vi
d
[
p(β(vi))G(vi)
]
dvi
=  β′(vi) (6)
Observe that
p(β(vi))G(vi) =  Pr[ i  win the object| i offer β(vi)]Pr
[
max
j /=  i
β(vj) ≤  β(vi)
]
that is the probability to win the object with a bid β(vi) and this bid is to be the highest in the auction. Hence Eq. (6)
corresponds to equality between benefit and cost expected at the margin.
Integrating (6) the equilibrium bid is given implicitly by the following integral equation:
β(vi) =
∫ vi
v˜
s
d
[
p(β(s))G(s)]
ds
ds  (7)
The following theorem establishes the sufficient conditions for the equilibrium of the Chinese auction.14
Theorem  7.  Consider  that  Assumptions  1–4 hold.  Additionally  assume  that  1 −  p′(b)G(v)v  >  0 for  any  v ∈  [v˜,  ω]
and b > 0.  Hence  the  symmetric  equilibrium  strategy  of  the  Chinese  auction  will  be  given  by  an  increasing  function
β(·) deﬁned  by
β(vi) =
{∫ vi
v˜
s
d
[
p(β(s))G(s)]
ds
ds
}
1(v˜,ω],  vi ∈  [0,  ω] (8)
Proof.  Initially observe that, according to Assumption 3, for every non-effective competitor, the best response to any
rivals’ strategy is to always submit a zero bid. Afterwards, fix some participant i and assume that all other participants
in the Chinese auction follow the strategies defined by (8). Assume that i’s valuation is vi but he or she offers b  different
from β(vi). First, the bidder i  never offers b  < 0 or b  >  b. Then it must be the case that b  ∈ [0,  b]. The continuity and
13 At this point it is worth mentioning that Proposition 6 shows that the expected payoff in the Chinese auction is isomorphic to the multiplicatively
separable environment proposed by Kaplan et al. (2002).
14 Questions related to the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium are discussed in Appendix A.
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he monotonicity of β(·) in [0, ω] imply that for each b  ∈  [0, b] there is z ∈  [0, ω] such that b  = β(z). Thus the deviation
o b from β(vi) is equivalent to the deviation to z  from vi.
If vi ∈  [0, v˜] and z ∈ [0, v˜] then, as it was observed initially, i’s best reply is to offer β(z) =  0 =  β(vi). Now assume
hat vi ∈  [0, v˜], z  ∈  (v˜,  ω] and i offers β(z) > 0. In this case the difference between the expected payoffs for β(z) > 0 and
(vi) =  0 is
p(β(z))viG(z) −  β(z) −  εviG(v˜)
= [p(β(z))G(z) −  εG(v˜)] vi −  β(z)
≤ [p(β(z)) −  ε] vi −  β(z)
0
The last inequality is guaranteed by Assumption 3. In case vi ∈ (v˜, ω] and z ∈  [0, v˜], one should only invert the
easoning used in the previous situation.
Finally, consider the case where vi ∈ (v˜,  ω] and z  ∈  (v˜,  ω], and assume that i  has valuation vi and use β(z). His
xpected payoff is
Wi(z,  vi) =  vip(β(z))G(z) −  β(z)
To differentiate the above function with respect to z  one should have that
∂Wi(z,  vi)
∂z
=  vi
d
[
p(β(z))G(z)]
dz
−  β′(z)
= vi
d
[
p(β(z))G(z)]
dz
−  zd
[
p(β(z))G(z)]
dz
= (vi −  z)
d
[
p(β(z))G(z)]
dz
herefore
∂Wi(z,  vi)
∂z
{≥ 0 if vi ≥  z
≤ 0 if vi ≤  z
Thus Wi(z,  vi) is maximized when z  =  vi. Finally, the supposition that 1 −  p′(b)G(v)v  >  0 guarantees that β′(v) ≥  0
or any v  ∈  [v˜,  ω]. 
Integrating by parts the right-hand side of (7) it should be the case that
[
vip(β(vi))G(vi) −  β(vi)
] = v˜εG(v˜) + ∫ vi
v˜
p(β(s))G(s)ds  (9)
The left-hand side of (9) represents the i’s expected gain when he or she offers a bid β(vi). The two terms of the
ight-hand side of the same equation are, respectively, the highest expected gain among all non-effective participants
nd the incremental utility gain when the probability of winning increases and becomes greater than ε  by offering a
ositive bid. It is clear that vip(β(vi))G(vi) −  β(vi) > v˜εG(v˜) >  0 as long as p(β(s))G(s) > 0 for any s  ∈  (v˜,  vi] with
i > v˜.If the auction is standard so that p(β(vi)) =  1 for any i, then it is the case that15
β(vi) =
∫ vi
0
sg(s)ds  (10)
15 If the auction is standard, then the supposition about the existence of a valuation v˜ as defined is innocuous since participants will behave in the
ame way for any valuation smaller or greater than v˜.
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where g  = G′. This is exactly the symmetric equilibrium bid of a standard all-pay auction with private and independent
valuations.16
Notice that integrating (10) by parts it should be the case that
viG(vi) −  β(vi) =
∫ vi
0
G(s)ds (11)
So that the left-hand side of (11) represents the expected payoff of a participant in the standard all-pay auction.
4.1.  Equilibrium  properties
What is the effect of the stochastic nature of the Chinese auction on the participants’ bids and expected gains? The
following propositions partially answer this question.
Proposition 8.  Let  B(·) and  β(·) be  the  equilibrium  bids  in  an  all-pay  auction  and  in  a Chinese  auction,  respectively,
and when  assumed  that  B(0) = 0,  one  should  have  that
(a) B(v) ≥  β(v) for  any  v  ∈ [0, v˜].
(b) For  all  v  ∈  (v˜,  ω], β(v) ≤ B(v) if  the  variational  inequality  γ ′(b) ≥ ξ(b) is  holding  for  any  b  ∈  (0,  b],  where  b  =
β(ω), γ(b) =  ln [1 −  p(b)]−1 and  ξ(b) = [H(b)φ(b)] with  φ  = β−1 and  H = G  ◦  φ.
Proof. The part (a) is straightforward (in fact B(v˜) >  0 =  β(v˜)). To prove (b), notice that from the first-order conditions
for β  and B, one should have that
β′ = p(β)g(v)v
1 −  p′(β)G(v)v (12)
and
B′ =  vg(v) (13)
Together, Eqs. (12) and (13) imply that
β′ = p(b)
1 −  p′(b)H(b)φ(b)B
′
where H(b) and φ(b) are defined according to enunciate. Therefore, if
p(b)
1 −  p′(b)H(b)φ(b) ≤  1 forany b  ∈  (0,  b] (14)
then for values greater than v˜, the function B  has more vertical tangents in all points. Notice that both functions are
increasing for values greater or equal to v˜ and, using the first part of the proposition, the desired result is reached.
Finally, after some algebraic manipulations, the condition on (14) is equivalent to the variational inequality on item
(b) of Proposition 8. 
Fig. 1 illustrates the conclusions of Theorem 7.
When γ ′(b) < ξ(b) for some b, it is not straightforward to determine what the highest bid is. More specifically, there
could be a pool of high values such that B(v) ≤  β(v). This possibility is illustrated by Fig. 2.
Proposition 9.  If  WCA(·) and  WAP(·) represent  the  expected  gains  in  the  Chinese  auction  and  in  the  all-pay  auction,
respectively, then  there  is  a realization  α  ∈  [0, v˜] such  that:
1. If  G(α)/G(v˜) <  ε <  1 then  WAP (v) ≤  WCA(v˜).
2. If  0 <  ε  <  G(α)/G(v˜) ≤  1 then  WAP (v) ≥  WCA(v) for  any  v ∈ (v˜,  ω].
16 See Krishna (2005).
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Fig. 1. Equilibrium bids in all-pay and Chinese auctions with the conditions of Proposition 8.
Fig. 2. Equilibrium bids in all-pay and Chinese auctions without the conditions of Proposition 8.
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Proof.  By definition
WAP (v) =
∫ v
0
G(s)ds  forany v  ∈  [0,  ω]
and
WCA(v) =
⎧⎨
⎩
v˜εG(v˜) if v  = v˜
v˜εG(v˜) +
∫ v
v˜
s
d
[
p(β(s))G(s)]
ds
ds  if v ∈  (v˜,  ω]
Considering the first case where v  ∈ [0, v˜], one should have that
WAP (v) −  WCA(v) =
∫ v
0
G(s)ds  − v˜εG(v˜)
=
∫ v
0
G(s)ds  +
∫ 0
v˜
G(s)ds  −
∫ 0
v˜
G(s)ds  − v˜εG(v˜)
=
∫ v
v˜
G(s)ds  +
∫ v˜
0
G(s)ds  − v˜εG(v˜)
=
∫ v˜
0
G(s)ds  − v˜εG(v˜) −
∫ v˜
v
G(s)ds
The Integral Mean Value Theorem (IMVT) guarantees that there exists α ∈  [0, v˜] such that
WAP (v) −  WCA(v) = v˜G(α) − v˜εG(v˜) −
∫ v˜
v
G(s)ds
= v˜ [G(α) −  εG(v˜)] −
∫ v˜
v
G(s)ds
If G(α)/G(v˜) <  ε <  1 then WAP (v) ≤  WCA(v). Consider now the case where v ∈  (v˜,  ω]. Hence,
WCA(v) −  WAP (v) = v˜εG(v˜) +
∫ v
v˜
p(β(s))G(s)ds  −
∫ v
v˜
G(s)ds  −
∫ v
0
G(s)ds  +
∫ v
v˜
G(s)ds
= v˜εG(v˜) −
∫ v
v˜
[
1 −  p(β(s))]G(s)ds  − ∫ v
0
G(s)ds  −
∫ v˜
v
G(s)ds
= v˜εG(v˜) −
∫ v˜
0
G(s)ds  −
∫ v
v˜
[
1 −  p(β(s))]G(s)ds
Applying once again the IMVT one should have that
WCA(v) −  WAP (v) = v˜εG(v˜) − v˜G(α) −
∫ v
v˜
[
1 −  p(β(s))]G(s)ds
=  −v˜ [G(α) −  εG(v˜)] −
∫ v
v˜
[
1 −  p(β(s))]G(s)ds
Therefore, if 0 <  ε <  G(α)/G(v˜) ≤  1 then WCA(v) ≤  WAP (v). 
The first part of the proposition above establishes that if the exogenous winning probability is reasonably high, then,
on average, participants of a Chinese auction will obtain higher payoffs than the participants of an all-pay auction. This
result is strongly based on Assumption 3. In other words, this result states that whenever there are good chances to get
the good auctioned for free in the Chinese auction, agents will be better off comparing to the situation where they pay
some positive amount to receive the good with probability one.In the second part the reasoning is inverted. If there are only effective competitors in both types of auctions, a low
exogenous winning probability increases the winning probability that depends on the bid boosting competition in the
Chinese auction, inducing participants to raise their bids which reduce the expected payoff. Finally, since there is no
effect on competition in the all-pay auction the participants will be, on average, better off than in the Chinese auction.
iG
C
v
5
i
s
w
r
t
p
l
P
e
w
P
t
(
sM. Benegas / EconomiA 16 (2015) 93–110 103
In order to illustrate the conclusions from Proposition 9, consider the following example. Suppose that F  is uniform
n [0, ω]. Then, it should be the case that∫ v˜
0
( s
ω
)N−1
ds  = v˜
N
NωN−1
Hence, it is possible to notice that v˜G(α) = v˜N/NωN−1 implying G(α) =  N−1(v˜/ω)N−1 =  N−1G(v˜) such that
(α)/G(v˜) =  1/N. Hence, according with Proposition 9, if ε > 1/N  then the expected payoffs will be greater in the
hinese auction for values in [0, v˜] and if ε < 1/N  then the expected payoffs will be greater in the all-pay auction for
alues in (v˜,  ω].
.  Model  with  linear  probability
Suppose that p(·) is defined as
p(b) =  (1 −  ε)θb  +  ε  (15)
The linear probability may be seen as a general case of success function in its ratio form. In fact, with perfect
nformation about the bids it is possible to define, for every i
p(bi) = bi∑
j /=  ibj +  bi
(16)
o that if θ  =  1/
(∑
j /=  ibj +  bi
)
and ε  = 0 (15) and (16) are equal.
Eq. (15) indicates that p(0) = ε  and p(b) = θb  if ε  = 0. Besides, the slope coefficient of p(b) reflects how much the
inning probability is affected by the bid so that, for a given θ, the smaller the luck factor the greater will be the bid’s
elevance. On the other hand, for a given ε, greater relevance of the bid is obtained for higher values of θ. Hence,
he lower the values of θ  greater influence other random factors will have on the winning probability, besides the
articipant’s bid.17
The following result is actually an explicit solution of the equilibrium bid when the winning probability function is
inear.
roposition 10.  In  the  Chinese  auction,  if  the  lottery  speciﬁes  a winning  probability  according  to  (12),  then  the
quilibrium bid  will  be  given  by
β(vi) = ε(1 −  ε)θ
[
exp
(
(1 −  ε)θ
∫ vi
v˜
h(s)ds
)
−  1
]
1(v˜,ω], vi ∈  [0,  ω] (17)
here
h(s) = g(s)s[1 −  (1 −  ε)θG(s)s] (18)
roof.  For all i, if vi ∈ [0, v˜] it was already shown in Theorem 7 that the best response is β(vi) = 0. Then, consider
hat vi ∈  (v˜,  ω] for i  fixed. In this case, first-order conditions of i’s expected payoff maximization problem are given by
(1 −  ε)θβ′(vi)G(vi)vi + [(1 −  ε)θβ(vi) +  ε] g(vi)vi =  β′(vi) (19)
Rearranging (19) leads to the following differential equation:β′(vi) −  (1 −  ε)θh(vi)β(vi) =  εh(vi) (20)
17 In most works about contests, θ is determined endogenously by construction of the success function. An exception is the work of O’Keeffe et al.
1984) where the authors propose a rationale for the determination of θ. This rationale implies in raising the influence of random factors when one
eeks to minimize an inefficiently high level of effort.
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Define
μ(vi) =  exp
(
−
∫ vi
v˜
(1 −  ε)θh(s)ds
)
(21)
that is, μ(vi) is the integrating factor of the differential equation in (20). Observe that
μ′(vi)θ(1 −  ε) =  −h(vi)μ(vi) (22)
Hence, multiplying both sides of (20) by (21) and using (22) it should be the case that
d [β(vi)μ(vi)]
dvi
=  − ε(1 −  ε)θμ
′(vi) (23)
Integrating (23) from v˜ to vi one should have that
β(vi) = ε(1 −  ε)θ
[
exp
(∫ vi
v˜
(1 −  ε)θh(s)ds
)
−  1
]
(24)

Example  11.  In this example, the equilibrium bid is obtained assuming that v is uniformly distributed in [0, ω]. Then,
for v  ∈  (v˜,  ω]
β(vi) = ε(1 −  ε)θ
{
exp
[
(N  −  1)
∫ vi
v˜
sN−1
aN −  sN ds
]
− 1
}
(25)
where a  =  ω/[ω(1 −  ε)θ]1/N . The solution in (25) is explicitly given as
β(vi) = ε(1 −  ε)θ
{(
ωN−1 −  (1 −  ε)θv˜N
ωN−1 −  (1 −  ε)θvNi
)(N−1)/N
−  1
}
(26)
A more convenient way to represent the solution in (26) can be obtained by substituting the effective competitors
threshold for the quantile function of the distribution.18 The quantile function of the uniform distribution is given by
Q(t) = tω  with 0 < t  < 1. In this case, (26) becomes
β(vi) = ε(1 −  ε)θ
{
ω1/N
(
1 −  (1 −  ε)θtNω
ωN−1 −  (1 −  ε)θvNi
)(N−1)/N
−  1
}
(27)
The winning probability function may be expressed in terms of competitor i’s valuation as follows:
q(vi) =  p(β(vi)) =  εω1/N
(
1 −  (1 −  ε)θtNω
ωN−1 −  (1 −  ε)θvNi
)(N−1)/N
Notice that the solution in (27) satisfies the conditions of Theorem 7 if the parameters of the model satisfy the
restriction that (1 −  ε)θω  < 1, which is trivially satisfied if ω  is normalized to one. Suppose in this case there are 5
competitors, θ  = 0.75, ε  = 0.01 and the effective competitors threshold is the distribution’s median (t  = 0.5). For this
numerical example in particular Fig. 3 depicts both the graphs of the equilibrium bid and the winning probability as
functions of the competitors’ valuations.
In Fig. 4, the threshold is now the first quartile of the distribution, the value of θ  is reduced to 0.5 and the luck factor
is raised to ε  = 0.3.
5.1.  Parameters’  effects  on  competition  in  the  Chinese  auction
In this section some comparative statics results are presented aiming to evaluate how the parameters of the model
affect competition in the Chinese auction. Propositions 12 and 13, below, show how the value of v˜ affects the probability
of occurrence of effective competitors as well as the equilibrium bid.
18 The quantile functions of F is defined as Q(t) = inf {z ; F(z) ≥ t}. See Severini (2005) for details.
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Fig. 3. Equilibrium bid (blue line) and winning probability function (red line) for N = 5, θ = 0.75, ε = 0.01, t = 0.5 and ω = 1.
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aFig. 4. Equilibrium bid (blue line) and winning probability function (red line) for N = 5, θ = 0.9, ε = 0.001, t = 0.25 and ω = 1.
roposition  12.  For  any v˜ ∈  (0,  ω),  deﬁne  the  function  gK : (0, ω) →  [0, 1] as
gK(v˜) =  Pr[ ˜K  =  K
∣∣ v˜]
Additionally  denote  by  	(N  −  1) /2
  and  (N  −  1) /2  the  smaller  and  larger  integers  closest  to (N −  1) /2,
espectively. Then,  one  should  have  that
. For  K  =  0,  1,  ...,  	(N  −  1) /2
  if  F (v˜) < 12 then  g′K(v˜) >  0;
. For  K  =  (N  −  1) /2,  (N  −  1) /2  +  1,  ...,  N  −  1 if  F (v˜) > 12 then  g′K(v˜) <  0
roof. It is straightforward to show that
g′K(v) ∝
[1 −  F (v)]
F (v) −
K
[(N  −  1) −  K] for any K  =  0,  1,  .  .  ., N  −  1 (28)
By definition 	(N  −  1) /2
  ≤ (N −  1) /2, then K  =  0,  1,  . .  ., 	(N  −  1) /2
  if and only if K  ≤ (N −  1) /2 implying
hat K/ [(N −  1) −  K] ≤  1. However if F (v˜) < 12 then [1 −  F (v)] /F (v) >  1 which concludes the proof of 1. The proof
f 2 follows the same reasoning. 
This result establishes that if v˜ is smaller than the median of the distribution F, then the probability of occurrence of
ffective competitors until approximately half of the participants increases with v˜. On the other hand, if the probability
f occurrence of values smaller than v˜ is high (and, therefore, the probabilities above v˜ is low) then the probability of
ccurrence of effective competitors until approximately half of the participants decreases with v˜.
Suppose, for example, that the distribution of values is uniform in [0, 1] and that N  = 4, so that 	(N  −  1) /2
  =  1
nd (N  −  1) /2  =  2. Notice that
g′K(v˜) =
(
3
K
)
[1 − v˜]K v˜3−K(3 −  K)[1 − v˜]−1
{
1 − v˜
v˜
− K(3 −  K)
}
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Assume initially that v˜ <  1/2. Hence,
g′0(v˜) = v˜33[1 − v˜]−1
{
1 − v˜
v˜
}
>  0
g′1(v˜) =  3 [1 − v˜] v˜22[1 − v˜]−1
{
1 − v˜
v˜
− 1
2
}
> 0
The signal of g′2(v˜) is ambiguous since (1 − v˜)/v˜ may be greater or smaller than 1/2. Assume now that v˜ > 1/2. In
this case, the sign of g′1(v˜) is also ambiguous. On the other hand,
g′2(v˜) =  3[1 − v˜]2v˜[1 − v˜]−1
{
1 − v˜
v˜
−  2
}
< 0
g′3(v˜) =  −∞  <  0
The following result indicates how chances in the threshold of effective competitors affect the equilibrium bids.
Proposition 13.  For  any  effective  competitor,  the  equilibrium  bid  decreases  with v˜.
Proof. For simplicity, define bi =  β(vi). In this case, after some algebraic manipulations, one should have that
∂bi
∂v˜
=  −εh(v˜) exp
(
(1 −  ε)θ
∫ vi
v˜
h(s)ds
)
<  0

The proposition above indicates that an increase in v˜ makes effective competitors less aggressive. There are two
explanations that can shed a light on this result. First, according to the conditions of Proposition 12, if v˜  is greater than
the distribution’s median then an increase in v˜  reduces the belief that there is a large number of effective competitors.
Thus, each effective competitor starts to believe that there are fewer effective competitors, increasing his chances of
winning even with his bid remaining unchanged. And, second, an increase in v˜ boosts the pool of values to which the
optimal strategy is to bid zero or, in other words, the occurrence of competitors relying on luck becomes more likely.
Another interesting exercise is to evaluate the effect of changes in the luck factor on the equilibrium bid of the
effective competitors. Actually, changes in ε  modify the format of the winning probability function. More specifically,
in the model with linear probability, an increase in ε raises the intercept but lowers the slope of the success function.
There are two possible settings in this case. First, it may be the case that the increase in the intercept is proportionally
smaller than the decrease in the slope of the winning probability function so that this function after an increase in ε
crosses at some point the function before ε  changes. The second possibility is the case where the winning probability
increases uniformly with the luck factor. These two possibilities are depicted below.
In Fig. 5, the two possible changes in the winning probability function due to an increase in the luck factor from
ε to ε′ are shown. In (a) the case where the new winning probability function intercepts the previous one at some bid
associated to a value vε is depicted. And, in (b), on the other hand, it is assumed that the winning probability increases
uniformly with ε.
In order to make the analysis more intuitive, consider the case where for any changes in the luck factor, effective
competitors will simply adjust their bids so that their winning probabilities remain unchanged. Note that, in the first
case, effective competitors’ behavior is asymmetric in respect to an increase in the luck factor; competitors with
valuations below a certain vε will reduce their bids and competitors with valuations above vε will increase their bids.
Before analyzing these comments, it is important to assess if this intersection is actually possible given the model’s
conditions. In other words, is there vε such that (1 −  θβ(vε))dε  =  0 for dε  /=  0? If this is the case, then θβ(vε) =  1
which would imply that p(β(vε)) =  1 contradicting the supposition that p(b) < 1 for any b. Hence, the only plausible
case is the one represented in Fig. 5(b), i.e., the winning probability increases uniformly with the luck factor.
Notice that in the case depicted in Fig. 5(b) all effective competitors respond in the same way to an increase in the luck
factor; in order to keep their winning probabilities unchanged, they all will reduce their bids. However, these reductions
will be proportionally uneven. As suggested by the figure in consideration, effective competitors with low valuations
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close to v˜) will decrease their bids proportionally more than those with high valuations (close to ω). This could be
een analytically by noticing that for any b > 0 and a fixed p(b) it should be the case that db/dε  = −  (1 − θb)/(1 −  ε)θ  < 0
nd |db/dε| is decreasing in b  and, consequently, in v.
The intuition behind this result becomes clearer by considering a reduction in the luck factor instead of an
ncrease. This reduction makes all effective competitors more aggressive in terms of keeping their winning proba-
ilities unchanged. However, this aggressiveness is uneven. Those competitors with low valuations would increase
heir bids more proportionally than those with high valuations. This result suggests that low valuations are proportion-
lly more affected by a reduction in the luck factor because their winning probabilities are very close to the luck factor
nd, therefore, a reduction in this factor requires a proportionally higher effort by these participants in order to keep
heir winning probabilities unaltered.
Effective competitors with high valuations, on the other hand, will have winning probabilities well above the luck
actor and, therefore, the necessary adjustments to maintain their winning probabilities unchanged need not be so great
in fact, on the limit, for sufficiently small reductions these adjustments will be close to zero).
As an illustration, consider two public contests where everything is the same except for the luck factor. In contest
 the luck factor is ε1 and in contest e the luck factor is ε2 such that ε1 > ε2. One possible interpretation is that the first
ontest’s exam is easier than second contest’s exam.19
The linear probability model suggests that individuals with low valuations will provide higher levels of effort in
xam 2 than those with high valuations, as they aim to keep the winning probability unaltered in both exams.
The fundamental question is that if effective competitors will really adjust their bids in order to keep their winning
robabilities unchanged. In order to provide an answer to this question, payoffs in the case that the winning probability
o not change should be compared to the gains resulting from an adjustment, from below or from above, on the winning
robability.19 This may seem unreasonable at first. However, it is possible to provide two different justifications. First, imagine that in each contest there are
wo types of tests: one that is difficult to associate ε2, and an easier one, associated to ε1. The exams are randomly chosen before being applied and
articipants do not know about this randomization mechanism and, therefore, they have no beliefs about the type of exam. Another justification is
hat the luck factor may be used to “calibrate” the level of competition when it is affected by an exogenous interference. As an example, a public
lacement may not specify ex-ante in which location in the country the selected participants will actually work. Compared to another contest that
pecifies the location, the organizers of the contest may deal with the lack of interest of potential participants by applying an easier exam, i.e.,
ncreasing the luck factor.
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Defining W  as the equilibrium expected payoff of an effective competitor with valuation v and bid b =  β(v). Then,
according to Eq. (9), it should be the case that
dW
dε
= (1 −  θb)vG(v) −  [1 −  (1 −  ε)θvG(v)]db
dε
(29)
Hence,
dW
dε
∝
[ (1 −  θb)vG(v)
1 −  (1 −  ε)θvG(v) −
db
dε
]
(30)
The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (30) is positive and the second term, as assumed before (see Theorem
7), is also positive, i.e., 1 −  (1 −  ε)θvG(v) >  0. Thus
dW
dε
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
≥ 0 if db
dε
≤ (1 −  θb)vG(v)
1 −  (1 −  ε)θvG(v) forany v  ∈  (v˜,  ω]
< 0 if
db
dε
>
(1 −  θb)vG(v)
1 −  (1 −  ε)θvG(v) forany v  ∈ (v˜,  ω]
(31)
Note that expression (31) establishes that if the bid is reduced because of an increase in the luck factor, then expected
payoff will be bigger. But, this expression also shows that the payoffs increase due to a larger luck factor if the bid
increases by no more than (1 −  θb)vG(v)/ [1 −  (1 −  ε)θvG(v)] for any v ∈  (v˜,  ω].
The question of interest here is that if it is advantageous for an effective competitor to maintain his winning
probability unaltered or modify it in response to a change in the luck factor. In order to investigate this problem,
consider the following approach. Define
db
dε
|W(ε)=const. = (1 −  θb)vG(v)1 −  (1 −  ε)θvG(v)
Then, Eq. (30) may be written as
dW
dε
∝
[
db
dε
∣∣∣∣
W(ε)=const.
− db
dε
]
(32)
If the bid is adjusted so that the winning probability is unaltered, then db/dε  = −  (1 −  θb)/(1 −  ε)θ  and Eq. (32)
results in
dW
dε
∝ (1 −  θb)(1 −  ε)θ >  0 (33)
Hence, if the bid is adjusted so that the winning probability is unaltered, the effective competitors’ payoffs increase
with the luck factor. This result was also reached by Amegashie (2006). The difference is that, in his study, the impact
of the luck factor on bids is symmetrical and welfare gains due to an increase in the luck factor occur directly (and
proportionally), independent of the effect over the bids.20
6.  Conclusions  and  extensions
This paper proposed to model the Chinese auction where risk-neutral participants compete, through an all-pay
auction, for a lottery where each participant may or may not win an indivisible object.
A symmetric equilibrium was obtained and some of its properties were studied. More specifically, it was shown that
when uncertainty about the result of the auction is introduced in the analysis, participants become less aggressive on
their bids when the winning probability satisfy a variational condition. It was also shown that the luck factor is decisive
in respect to the expected payoff when the Chinese and the standard all-pay auctions are compared. As established
by Proposition 9, among non-effective competitors, average payoffs will be higher in the Chinese auction if the luck
20 It is important to point out that in the paper of Amegashie (2006), luck is modeled in a different way. Specifically, the author uses a parameter
that measures the sensitivity of the success function with respect to the residual probability that does not depend on effort.
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actor is reasonably high. On the other hand, effective competitors will be, on average, worse off in the Chinese auction
hen the luck factor is small.
In Section 5, the model was specified assuming that the winning probability is linear on bids. Considering this
pecification, it was shown that bids decrease with the effective competitors’ threshold. Finally, the effect of the luck
actor over effective competitors’ bids was discussed. Although it was not possible to reach a conclusion about the
irection of the change of the bids in respect to changes in the luck factor, it was shown that, if effective competitors
djust their bids to keep the winning probability unaltered, a reduction in the luck factor will result in an increase in
he bids. This increase, however, occurs in greater proportions for effective competitors with valuations closer to the
hreshold.
There are several possible extensions to the original model. As mentioned before in the introduction, the public
ontest mechanism may be thought as a form of the Chinese auction. But, in many cases, a public contest offers several
lacements (as in the case of university applications). Hence, the model could be extended, in this case, to situations
here there are multiple identical goods (with unit demand).
Another possible extension would be not to assume that winning probabilities are anonymous. A way to do this
ould be to admit that the luck factor depends on each participant. As a consequence, an immediate complication will
merge: equilibrium will not be symmetrical.
Finally, perhaps the most interesting modification that can be proposed would be to allow agents to be risk-averse.
his would certainly enrich the model as considerations towards their attitudes of risk in respect to the lottery would
hange dramatically their behavior in the Chinese auction.
ppendix  A.  Existence  and  uniqueness  of  the  equilibrium
heorem  14.  Under  the  Assumptions  1 and 2 and  if 1 −  p′(b)G(v)v  >  0 for  any  b  ≥  0 and  v ∈  [v˜,  ω],  then  there  exists
n unique  equilibrium  b(·) in  the  Chinese  auction  for  v ∈  [0,  ω] such  that  b(0) = 0 and  b(ω) =  b.
roof. The proof of this theorem is basically the proof of uniqueness and existence of the solution for the initial value
roblem21
b′(v) =  h(v,  b),  b(v˜) =  0 (34)
here
h(v,  b) = p(b)g(v)v
1 −  p′(b)G(v)v (35)
The Theorem of existence and uniqueness for the solution of ordinary differential equations22 establishes that if a
unction h(v,  b) is uniformly Lipschitzian in the second variable, then there exists a solution to (19) and it is unique.
et | · | be the usual norm in R. It should be shown that for any b1,  b2 ∈  [0,  b] there is a constant L  ≥  0 such that
|h(v,  b1) −  h(v,  b2)| ≤  L |b1 −  b2| for any v  ∈  [v˜,  ω]
For that, notice that suppositions 1 and 2 guarantee that there are nonnegative constants23 M, L1 and L2 such that
g(v) ≤  M,  ∀v  ∈  [0,  ω] (36)
|p(b1) −  p(b2)| ≤  L1,  ∀b1, b2 ∈ [0,  b] (37)∣∣p′(b1) −  p′(b2)∣∣ ≤  L2, ∀b1, b2 ∈ [0,  b] (38)
After some algebraic manipulations it is possible to conclude that∣[ ] [ ]∣
|h(v,  b1) −  h(v,  b2)| =  g(v)v
∣ p(b1) −  p(b2) +  G(v)v p(b2)p′(b1) − p(b1)p′(b2) ∣∣∣[1 −  p′(b1)G(v)v] [1 −  p′(b2)G(v)v]∣∣ (39)
21 Note that for any v ∈ [0, v˜], b(v) = 0 is a solution.
22 See Agarwal and O’Regan (2008).
23 The assumption that p(·) is twice differentiable guarantee that p(·) and p′(·) are Lipschitzian functions.
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Using the triangular inequality in (37) one should have that
|h(v,  b1) −  h(v,  b2)| ≤ g(v)v
|p(b1) −  p(b2)| + G(v)v
∣∣p(b2)p′(b1) −  p(b1)p′(b2)∣∣∣∣[1 −  p′(b1)G(v)v] [1 −  p′(b2)G(v)v]∣∣
≤ g(v)v |p(b1) −  p(b2)| + g(v)v2
∣∣p(b2)p′(b1) −  p(b1)p′(b2)∣∣
(40)
The second inequality in (25) results from the supposition that 1 −  p′(b)G(v)v  >  0 for any b  ≥  0 and v  ∈ [v˜,  ω].
Using (21) and (22) and the fact that v  ≤  ω  it should be the case that
|h(v,  b1) −  h(v,  b2)| ≤  MωL1 |b1 −  b2| +  Mω2
∣∣p(b2)p′(b1) − p(b1)p′(b2)∣∣ (41)
Note that∣∣p(b2)p′(b1) −  p(b1)p′(b2)∣∣ = ∣∣[p(b2) −  p(b1)]p′(b1) +  p(b1) [p′(b1) −  p′(b2)]∣∣ (42)
Using the triangular inequality and (21) and (22) in (27) and then the result in (26) one should have that
|h(v,  b1) −  h(v,  b2)| ≤  MωL1 |b1 −  b2| +
Mω2L1 |b2 −  b1|p′(b1) +  Mω2p(b1)L2 |b1 −  b2|
(43)
Finally, considering the fact that24 p′(b) ≤  N  for some N  ≥  0 and p(b) ≤  1 it should be the case that
|h(v,  b1) −  h(v,  b2)| ≤  C |b1 −  b2|
where C  =  Mω [L1 (1 +  ωN) +  ωL2]. 
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